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The Personal Wealth Interests of Politicians and Government Intervention in the Economy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
We examine whether there is a correlation between personal wealth interests of politicians and their 
decisions to intervene in the economy. We use the setting of the government’s support of financial 
institutions under the 2008 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act. We find that the personal wealth 
interests of politicians are positively associated with voting in favor of the EESA.   
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The Personal Wealth Interests of Politicians and Government Intervention in the Economy 
1. Introduction 
 We use unique, comprehensive data on the wealth of US politicians during the financial crisis 
of 2008 to document empirically that the personal wealth interests of politicians exhibit a positive 
association with their vote to rescue financial institutions during the financial crisis of 2008. A better 
understanding of the basic question “what motivates politicians?” is important given the frequency of 
government interventions in the economy (Calderon and Schaeck, 2016). The typical answer in the 
political economy literature to this question is that politicians are economic agents who try to stay in 
office by balancing the interests of their voters and those of special interest groups (Buchanan, 1989; 
Levitt, 1996; Mian, Sufi and Trebbi, 2010; Peltzman, 1976; Peltzman). However, some authors argue 
that politicians are “persons of character” who seek public office in the public’s interest without much 
concern for whether there are benefits from them privately (Alesina, 1988; Witman, 1977).  
 The available evidence on this question, however, overlooks one important possibility. 
Politicians have a personal stake in the economy and the value of that stake depends, in part, on their 
legislative work. Thus, we propose to augment the standard voting model that includes ideological 
position and electoral prospects (see, e.g., Mian et al., 2010) by an additional economically-meaningful 
factor, i.e., personal wealth interests. Examining the role of the personal wealth of politicians in their 
voting poses three empirical challenges. First, such an investigation requires a direct measure of the 
wealth of politicians and, in particular of their asset holdings in firms. Second, there are at least three 
possible explanations for a correlation between the personal wealth interests of politicians and their vote 
to rescue financial institutions. For one, it is possible that politicians vote to directly benefit their own 
personal wealth. On the other hand, representatives who have a personal wealth stake in financial 
institutions might simply have better information about the gravity of the crisis than other 
representatives (perhaps by observing the loss of value in their holdings). Finally, it is possible that 
politicians who hold assets in the financial sector are more “finance friendly” or hold stronger beliefs 
about the importance of financial intermediation for the working of the economy than those who do not 
have these asset holdings and for that reason vote in favor of the rescue. We cannot separately identify 
personal wealth interests from the explanations that those with a stake in the financial sector have better 
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information or stronger beliefs about the importance of financial intermediation. For this, we would 
need to have a random assignment of asset holdings to politicians. We offer some tests, described in 
more detail below, in the absence of random variation in holdings, which explore the role of being 
“finance friendly” or having better information about the gravity of the crisis relative to the incentives 
coming from personal wealth, but we recognize that these tests fall short of separately identifying the 
possible explanations. Third, it is possible that asset holdings of politicians represent part of a “quid-
pro-quo” relation between representatives and firms, in which politicians vote in the interests of the 
firms in which they hold stocks in return for campaign donations and other reelection support (Tahoun, 
2014). Thus, the asset holdings of politicians in financial institutions might represent possible “latent 
connections” between firms and politicians. Such political connections are already known to have 
played a role in the bailout decision in the 2008 financial crisis (Duchin and Sosyura, 2012).    
 We attempt to address these three challenges in our empirical design by exploiting finely-
grained data available due to the extensive personal finance disclosure laws governing US politicians. 
This data allows us to construct measures of asset holdings that include the stockholdings of politicians 
in financial institutions (and in non-financial firms), as well as more comprehensive measures of wealth 
that capture the politician’s bond and real estate holdings. In our tests, we examine how the personal 
wealth interests of members of Congress affect their vote on legislative proposals to deal with the 
deepening financial crisis in September and October of 2008. Specifically, we examine the House vote 
on September 29, 2008 on a draft bill proposed by Senator Christopher Dodd and Treasury Secretary 
Henry Paulson (H.R. 3997) and on a subsequent draft bill (H.R. 1424) that was voted on in both the 
Senate (on October 1) and the House (on October 3) and was ultimately turned into the Economic 
Emergency Stabilization Act (EESA). The EESA authorized the Treasury to spend $700 billion in an 
effort to stabilize financial markets and restore liquidity.  
We estimate that representatives are almost 60% more likely to vote in favor of government 
intervention when the financial crisis affected their personal wealth. We use a range of measures of 
personal wealth interest, not only to verify the robustness of our findings, but also to recognize the fact 
that the 2007－2008 crisis was not just limited to the financial sector, but affected markets broadly, 
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with spillovers to non-financial shares, real estate, and bond markets. Thus, the vote on EESA could 
potentially affect the personal wealth interests of politicians directly or indirectly by preventing their 
asset holdings from losing value. Thus, our measures of personal wealth interests vary from 
conservative estimates based on the value of a given politician’s asset holdings in the financial sector 
to comprehensive estimates of changes in net wealth.  
 We face the challenge that asset holdings are endogenous. Individuals who believe that 
financial intermediation is important hold more stocks in the financial sector. All else equal, those 
individuals are also more likely to support the government’s intervention in the financial sector during 
a crisis. Thus, an alternative interpretation of our findings is that “finance-friendly” members of 
Congress support government intervention in the economy. These politicians might be finance-friendly 
because they have asset holdings that are sensitive to the financial sector, because they are better 
informed about the gravity of the financial crisis and/or because they believe that financial institutions 
are important for the working of the economy. Our data does not allow us to disentangle these 
explanations. Instead, we offer several findings that probe each of these possible explanations in more 
detail. For example, we use proxies that are likely to capture a politician’s belief in the financial sector 
that is based on work experience, education, and membership in finance-related congressional 
committees. We also use the past investment behavior of politicians to examine the possibility that 
beliefs in financial intermediation are behind our results. Specifically, as we have data on the history of 
asset holdings of politicians prior to the EESA vote, we are able to identify a group of politicians who 
hold assets in the sector before, but crucially, not during the crisis. These individuals are likely to have 
similar preferences compared with those who continue (or start) to invest in financial sector stocks in 
2008. In particular, ex-investors and current investors are likely to share a belief in the importance of 
financial intermediation. The two groups, however, differ on one important dimension: whether they 
(still) own stocks during the crisis and can obtain personal wealth benefits from government 
intervention in the sector. If the ownership of financial stocks reflects beliefs in financial intermediation, 
one should not observe any differences in the voting behavior between ex-investors and current 
investors. If, on the other hand, personal wealth interests underlie the voting behavior in favor of the 
financial sector, we should find that current investors (but not ex-investors) are more likely to vote in 
6 
 
favor of the EESA. Our data show that being an ex-investor in the financial sector is not associated with 
voting. Only the asset holdings of current investors are associated with voting.  
We also conduct “placebo tests” in which we examine whether being an investor in financial 
institutions is associated with other votes in the 110th Congress. We find that personal wealth interests 
are only associated with those votes that can potentially affect a given politician’s wealth, but not with 
other roll call votes, which makes it less likely that personal wealth interests proxy for beliefs.  
We then examine a source of variation in personal wealth interests that is unlikely to be related 
to beliefs in the sector. We consider the participation in a defined contribution pension plan by the 
spouses of members of Congress. Specifically, we construct a measure of personal wealth interests 
based on the returns on these plans over 2008. Since returns are exogenous, the variation in returns is 
arguably uncorrelated with other determinants of voting behavior. In addition, the spouse’s choice to 
participate in a plan is likely to be independent of the politician’s beliefs in the sector. Indeed, 
compelling recent evidence suggests that a substantial part of the variation in investment behavior is 
genetically determined (Cronqvist and Siegel, 2013). But even if the spouse’s holdings were highly 
influenced by the politician’s preference, returns on the spousal plans should not be subject to the same. 
We document that the returns on the spousal pension plan are strongly associated with the vote on the 
EESA and interpret this as evidence consistent with the idea that the correlation between asset holdings 
and congressional voting reflects personal wealth interests.  
Finally, we address the last of the empirical challenges described above, namely that asset 
holdings might reflect (latent) political connections, by using a control-based strategy. We use again 
our detailed data on the politician’s asset holdings and compute measures of how responsive these asset 
holdings are (at the politician level) to campaign donations and lobbying expenditures of financial 
institutions, respectively. Adapting our approach from Tahoun (2014), these responsiveness measures 
proxy for the extent to which asset holdings vary with the reelection support and other influencing 
attempts from the financial sector. We find some evidence that latent connections between firms and 
politicians are associated with the vote on EESA, especially in the first vote, but these connections do 
not diminish the economic or statistical significance of having asset holdings in the financial sector to 
the vote.      
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Ultimately, our hypothesis is that politicians’ voting is associated with their personal wealth 
interests. Mian et al. (2010) suggest that a politician’s vote on the EESA is driven by their ideological 
position and their electoral prospects. In turn, their reelection probabilities are determined by the 
politicians’ ability to convince voters that they cater to the constituency’s interests, and by campaign 
spending, which is determined by their ability to attract special interest contributions. We propose that 
this voting model be augmented by an additional economically-meaningful factor, i.e., personal wealth 
interests, which may or may not conflict with either ideology or reelection probabilities. Indeed, we 
show that even in the presence of conflicting incentives deriving from voter interests, special interests, 
or political ideology, being an investor in the financial sector is significantly correlated with a 
politician’s voting. For example, with an eye towards these possibly competing determinants of a 
politician’s vote, we use nearest neighborhood matching to compare politicians who invest in financial 
institutions with those who do not. We match on campaign donations and on voter opposition to the 
EESA as well as (an exact match) on party affiliation and on ideology. We show that investors in 
financial institutions are more likely to vote in favor of the EESA compared with their matched 
counterpart, who do no hold assets in financial institutions.    
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I summarizes the events of the 
financial crisis of 2008 and provides a brief literature review. Section II describes the data we use, and 
Section III presents our main findings on the relation between voting in Congress and the personal 
wealth interests of politicians. Section IV presents the conclusions.  
2. Legislative Background and Prior Work 
2.1 The Congressional Response to the Financial Crisis of 2008 
 Since August 2007, regulators have attempted to turn the tide of the solvency problems banks 
faced as a result of the losses from their exposures to subprime mortgages. Despite these efforts, in the 
summer of 2008, financial market strains intensified as concerns increased that credit losses were 
mounting (International Monetary Fund, 2008). The US government’s intervention to guarantee support 
to two agencies with a crucial role in the American housing market (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) was 
not sufficient to prevent a firestorm (Acemoglu, Johnson, Kermani, Kwak and Mitton, 2011). In 
September 2008, Lehman Brothers submitted a bankruptcy filing that involved significant losses to 
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creditors and counterparties. Within days, market pressure forced the merger of Merrill Lynch with the 
Bank of America and the Federal Reserve (Fed) nationalized the American Insurance Group, the 
world’s largest insurance company. With the liquidity crisis worsening and as banks increasingly lost 
confidence in the creditworthiness of their counterparts, interbank markets effectively seized up. 
Massive coordinated liquidity injections by the Fed and other major central banks did little to contain 
investors’ panic.  
On September 20, 2008, Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson released a three-page “Legislative 
Proposal for Treasury Authority to Purchase Mortgage Related Assets.” Members of Congress were 
briefed on the plan in the chambers of House Speaker Nancy Pelosi. At that time the chairman of the 
Fed, Ben Bernanke offered the stark warning that “If we don’t do this, we may not have an economy 
on Monday.” (Sorking, Henriques, Andrews and Nocera, 2008). Two days later, Senator Christopher 
Dodd advanced a more detailed draft. On September 29, after many negotiations, the House voted on 
H.R. 3997 that combined Senator Dodd’s draft with Mr. Paulson’s original proposal. The House 
rejected the bill, with 205 in favor and 228 against. However, on October 1, 2008, the Senate approved 
H.R. 1424, by a vote of 74-25 that was an amended version of the bill that would become the EESA. 
On October 3, the House voted to concur with the Senate on H.R. 1424 and accepted the bill 263 to 
171. That day, the President signed the bill into law as Public Law 110-343 (SigTarp, 2009). 
The EESA authorized the $700 billion TARP that intended to provide support to US financial 
institutions by means of the Treasury purchasing or guaranteeing “troubled assets”. This support was 
achieved mainly through the Capital Purchase Program to which $250 billion was made available and 
which intended to invest in “qualified financial institutions” that were deemed financially healthy. 
2.2 Literature Review 
 An increasing number of studies uses the financial crisis, and in particular the legislative 
response to it, as a setting to study the behavior of politicians (and their relations with firms). Mian et 
al. (2010) provide compelling arguments for why the setting is advantageous when examining “the 
responsiveness of politicians to … various political and economic factors” (p. 1973). Crises heighten 
voter interests in political issues and increase the salience of bills. Thus, we can expect constituents to 
be well informed and motivated to monitor their representative’s voting behavior. What’s more, voters’ 
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interests potentially compete with those of financial institutions. Indeed, Mian et al. (2010) show that 
the campaign contributions from the financial industry affected the voting of the representatives on the 
EESA, although less so in the case of ideologically conservative members. On a related note, Duchin 
and Sosyura (2012) and Li (2010) show that politically connected financial institutions are more likely 
to receive government funding under TARP’s Capital Purchase Program. This finding is consistent with 
a strand of literature that documents politicians can intervene in the economy and distribute favors to 
firms in several significant ways such as corporate bailouts, taxation benefits, and the facilitation of 
access to cheap sources of financing (Claessens, Feijen and Laeven, 2008; Faccio, Masulis and 
McConnell, 2006; Khwaja and Mian, 2005).  
These prior studies investigate the value of firms’ connections to politicians often by using the 
event study method to take advantage of sudden changes in the value of a connection (Acemoglu, 
Johnson, Kermani, Kwak and Mitton, 2016; Akey, 2015; Faccio, 2006; Ferguson and Voth, 2008; 
Fisman, 2001; Fisman, Fisman, Galef and Khurana, 2006; Goldman, Rocholl and So, 2009; 
Jayachandran, 2006; Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Knight, 2006; Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006). Other 
studies use various measures of political connections (usually campaign donations or lobby 
expenditures). These studies document that firms benefit by higher future stock returns (Borisov, 
Goldman and Gupta, 2016; Cooper, Gulen and Ovtchinnikov, 2010), delayed fraud detection (Yu and 
Yu, 2008), reduced SEC oversight (Correia, 2009), increased innovation (Reza, Ovtchinnikov and Wu, 
2015), as well as by winning more government contracts (Goldman, Rocholl and So, 2008; Tahoun, 
2014) and experiencing a lower degree of competition in markets (Benmelech and Moskowitz, 2010; 
Bunkanwanicha and Wiwattanakantang, 2009). On the other hand, some authors argue that connections 
to politicians carry few benefits and can indicate agency problems (Aggarwal, Meschke and Wang, 
2009). Indeed, Kim (2015) documents that firms increase their investments in capital and R&D after 
the loss of their political connection.   
Our contribution to this literature is to point out that politicians can be connected to firms in a 
way not considered in most of these earlier studies (however, see Tahoun (2014)). As investors, 
politicians have an interest in benefiting the firms in which they own stocks even if these firms do not 
contribute to election campaigns or are otherwise observably connected to a given politician.  
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 Furthermore, the political economy literature has long debated whether members of Congress 
respond to the economic interests that their electorate or special interests provide (Peltzman, 1976; 
Peltzman, 1984) or whether they are “persons of character” who seek public office to change policy in 
the public interest (Alesina, 1988; Callander, 2008; Witman, 1977). Yet another possibility is that 
politicians seek to further their own narrow self-interest as measured by their net wealth just as any 
other utility maximizing agent would (Besley, 2004; Buchanan, 1989). The empirical evidence on this 
debate is mixed: for example, Diermeier et al. (2005) show that policy motivations at least partially 
explain the behavior of politicians; whereas Ferraz and Finan (2008) argue, in contrast, that monetary 
rewards are the principal motivation for politicians. Our study adds to this literature by arguing that the 
politician’s personal wealth is directly affected by their legislative work inasmuch as their personal 
assets are intimately linked with the firms that stand to benefit or loose from government intervention.  
 One extension of this literature considers whether politicians use knowledge obtained in office 
to trade stocks. The available evidence is mixed, with some studies suggesting that Congress members 
systematically beat the market index (Ziobrowski, Boyd, Cheng and Ziobrowski, 2011; Ziobrowski, 
Cheng, Boyd and Ziobrowski, 2004), while others argue that political constraints discourage politicians 
from trading on their information advantage (Eggers and Hainmueller, 2013). Complementing these 
insights are the findings in Cohen at al. (2013), who suggest that the voting behavior of politicians 
whose constituent firms are most affected by pending legislation predicts abnormal returns following 
the passing of the law. This finding suggests that politicians have a good sense of how their lawmaking 
affects firms.  
 More directly related to our study, Tahoun (2014) documents that the asset holdings of members 
of Congress are related to the campaign contributions of firms; this study suggests a quid-pro-quo 
relation between firms and politicians, facilitated by stock ownership, wherein firms benefit by 
obtaining more in government contracts.1 Whereas Tahoun highlights a channel in which asset holdings 
are used to forge a relation between firms and politicians, we emphasize a more direct role of these 
                                                     
1 Note that firms may support politicians in multiple ways in addition to campaign donations. For example, they 
might increase employment for the politicians’ voters (Bertrand, Kramarz, Schoar and Thesmar, 2006). Or 
connected financial institutions might ease lending conditions for firms in the politician’s district (Dinç, 2005).  
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holdings by raising the possibility that a politician’s voting can impact on the value of their holdings, 
which in turn might affect their decision of how to vote. Our approach complements the evidence in 
Tahoun (2014), inasmuch as not all politician shareholdings are intended to facilitate political 
connections and our conjecture is that even without a quid-pro-quo “deal” in place, politicians vote 
differently on issues related to firms in which they hold ownership than when they have no personal 
wealth interest. 
3. Data and Summary Statistics 
3.1 Data Sources  
Our primary interest is the association between politicians’ personal wealth and government’s 
intervention. We use data collected from several sources to investigate this association. We combine 
sources about a politician’s equity investments, voting behavior and background, as well as election 
campaign contributions and congressional district data. 
To start, we obtain data about the history of asset holdings of members of the 110th Congress 
from the Center for Responsive Politics for 2004-2008.2 According to the Ethics in Government Act of 
1978, members of Congress (and Executive Branch officials) are required to file annual reports 
disclosing their personal finances. Congressional ethics committees enforce and oversee compliance 
with this requirement. Members of Congress must file Financial Disclosure Report forms that record 
all assets that are held for investment and worth more than $1,000 at year end. Assets held in any self-
directed account or fund must be listed individually, along with their value and the type and amount of 
income they produce. When an asset is individually listed (as part of a holding of a fund), we include it 
in our computation of a politician’s equity investment in a firm. Assets yielding more than $200 in 
annual income must be listed, regardless of their value at year end. Members often report the value of 
each of their assets within one of several ranges. We use the midpoint of the range as our estimate of 
that asset’s value. When a politician mentions owning an asset but reports its value as “N/A” we view 
this as a below-disclosure-threshold holding and count the asset as an investment but assign it a zero 
                                                     
2 We use the web query on www.opensecrets.org to retrieve the data. The classification of reported assets in the 
disclosure reports is not always straightforward. We rely on the CRP classification of assets as stock and verify 
this with the original disclosure reports if their classification is missing or unclear. 
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dollar amount.3 They also record income, liabilities, and other sundry items.4 These forms must be filed 
annually by May 15 for the prior calendar year. The Center for Responsive Politics collects these reports 
from the Senate Office of Public Records and the Office of the Clerk of the House. The Center screens 
each of the listed assets and we populate our database with reported asset holdings in publicly listed 
financial institutions and in Standard and Poor’s 500 (non-financial) companies.  We focus on S&P 500 
companies to economize on the costs of hand-collecting the data.  
In addition to data on the personal finances of members of the 110th Congress, we also collect 
data on their voting records from the Office of the Clerk of the House and the Senate Bill Clerk. We 
supplement this with data on each congressional member’s margin of victory in the most recent election 
from the public records of the Federal Election Commission. Data on the number of terms each 
politician has served in Congress and whether they are running for reelection in the 2008 is provided in 
Mian et al. (2010). We obtain biographical data that includes prior employment history from the 2008 
edition of Congressional Biographies (part of the official Congressional Directory prepared by the Joint 
Committee on Printing).5 We determine the post-election employment of politicians not returning to 
Congress using data provided by the Capitol Insiders section of Political Moneyline.6 To determine 
each politician’s committee membership in the 110th Congress, we use data collected by Stewart and 
Woon (2009).7 
We also require data on the voters’ opposition to the government’s support of the financial 
sector as well as on campaign contributions by financial institutions. We obtain voter opinion data from 
the 2008 edition of the Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) (Ansolabehere, 2011). This 
data is available at the congressional district level, but was collected after the vote on the EESA (in 
October-November 2008). We therefore also obtain data from the Pew Research Center, which is based 
on a survey conducted in September 2008 (i.e., before the voting on EESA) and asks respondents about 
                                                     
3 This matters in analyses where we use indicator variables that denote investor status (which will take the value 
of unity for assets values as N/A) and variables that use the dollar amount of investments (which will be zero). 
4 These include contributions made in lieu of honoraria, gifts received, non-governmental positions held, travel 
that was paid for, and information referring to the member’s spouse and dependent children.  
5 Available at: http: www.gpo.gov/fdsys/browse  
6 See: http://www.politicalmoneyline.com/About.aspx  
7 Available at: http://web.mit.edu/17.251/www/data_page.html#1  
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their views on the government’s handling of the burgeoning crisis. We also measure voter interests by 
considering the constituency’s mortgage default rates and the fraction of the voters working in the 
financial sector. Data from the Mortgage Bankers Association’s National Delinquency Survey provides 
us with state-level data on residential mortgage delinquency and foreclosure rates. We use the data 
reported in Mian et al. (2010) on the finance employment of voters. We obtain data on campaign 
contributions by Political Action Committees (PAC) associated with financial institutions between 2003 
and 2008 from the Center for Responsive Politics, which in turn collects this information directly from 
the Federal Election Commission. However, we do not use the Center’s industry aggregated data, as 
their definition of the industry of interest “Finance, Insurance and Real Estate” includes companies that 
were not affected by the EESA.  
 We use census data on a range of variables describing a politician’s district including the 
percentage of Hispanics and the percentage of people living in an urban environment.8 
3.2 Summary Statistics 
 Table 1 presents the summary statistics for our variables of interest. These statistics are reported 
separately for congressional members who are investors in the financial sector and for those who are 
not. In table 1, the summary statistics for the variables of interest comprise the dollar amount of a 
representative’s asset holdings in the financial sector, the dollar amount of expected losses due to 
investments in the financial sector, the dollar amount of expected losses in the total stock portfolio, the 
percentage loss in net wealth during 2008, and the beginning of 2008 dollar amount of net wealth. We 
calculate each representative’s equity investment in the financial sector by adding the disclosed asset 
holdings in a sample of 555 publicly listed banks, savings associations, bank-holding companies, and 
savings and loan-holding companies (SIC 6020-6036), as well as life insurance companies (SIC 6310-
6319) trading on the NYSE, Amex, or the NASDAQ.9 10  
                                                     
8 These census data are taken from the data supplement in Mian et al. (2010). 
9 Life insurance companies (i.e., members of the American Council of Life Insurers) collectively applied for 
consideration under TARP (unlike property-casualty insurers, who, through the American Insurance Association, 
issued a statement that they would not seek government support). Because the Treasury allowed firms to 
simultaneously apply for government support and acquire a federally regulated bank, life insurance companies 
satisfied the requirement that only companies with federal regulatory oversight could be considered for support.  
10 Financial asset holdings via mutual or index funds are included if provided in the Center for Responsive Politics 
database.   
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 To illustrate the economic significance of the asset holdings of members of Congress in the 
financial sector, consider the following. In 2008, the collective investment of members of the House 
was between $23.3 and $74.5 million. About 30% (namely, 126 out of 434) of the representatives 
invested in financial institutions during 2008. The financial sector constitutes a meaningful fraction in 
the investment portfolios of politicians; we estimate that the average proportion of asset holdings in the 
financial sector compared to their holdings in non-financial S&P500 firms is about 18.5 percent (which 
is close to the sector weighting in the S&P500 at about 17.6 percent in 2007).   
 We compute the expected losses due to investments in the financial sector by multiplying the 
number of shares a politician holds in financial institutions at the beginning of 2008 by each of these 
shares’ change in stock price on September 29, 2008. We intend this variable to measure the expected 
losses in the event Congress does not pass the EESA; the losses realized due to the drop in stock prices 
after the House failed to pass the initial bailout proposal is a reasonable proxy for the same. Note, 
however, that the losses realized on September 29, if anything, understate the full effect of the event as 
the market likely anticipated some possibility that Congress could pass the EESA. 
 A more comprehensive measure of the expected losses considers not only the effect on the 
value of the investments in the financial sector, but also the effect on other investments in the stock 
market. Analogous to the expected losses due to investments in the financial sector, we compute the 
expected losses in the total stock portfolio by multiplying the number of shares a politician holds in 
financial institutions as well as in nonfinancial S&P 500 firms by each of these shares’ change in stock 
price on September 29. Asset holdings in the financial sector and in nonfinancial S&P 500 firms are 
highly correlated. The correlation between two indicator variables that capture whether a given 
politician holds assets in the financial sector and in the non-financial S&P 500, respectively, equals 0.50 
(p < 0.01, untabulated).   
 We use the percent change in a politician’s net wealth during 2008 as another proxy for the 
member’s wealth-sensitivity to the financial sector. Net wealth is defined as the total assets minus the 
liabilities reported by politicians in their personal finance disclosures. This particular measure also 
captures changes in the value of bond and real estate holdings. As a final wealth-sensitivity proxy, 
which likely constitutes the upper bound of a politician’s wealth exposure to the financial sector, we 
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use the dollar amount of the total net wealth (which again includes bond holdings and real estate in 
addition to equity). 
 Together, our set of proxies for the personal wealth-sensitivity to the financial sector of 
politicians covers the spectrum from conservative estimates relying on only the actual investments in 
financial institutions to more encompassing estimates that use data on the politicians’ net wealth and 
might include assets not directly related to financial institutions (but whose value depends on the 
intervention of the government in the sector). A priori, what motivates the voting behavior of politicians 
is not clear. But the possibility exists that only direct investments in the financial sector are sufficiently 
salient to provide personal wealth incentives to members of Congress. On the other hand, politicians 
might understand that not only their equity investments in the sector might be affected by the vote, but 
so too their net wealth.  
 In table 1, we also list summary statistics for the control variables. Importantly, we provide 
information on those variables that studies document to affect voting behavior. Specifically, we report 
a measure of the voters’ interests constructed from a question taken from the CCES 2008 
(Ansolabehere, 2011) that asks whether the respondent, in principle, supports or opposes legislation on  
the government’s intervention in the financial sector.11  We report summary statistics on the percentage 
of voters at the congressional district who are opposed to the legislation.12 We also report an alternative 
measure of the voters’ interests used in prior work (Mian et al., 2010), that is, the importance of the 
financial sector to the representative’s congressional district. This variable is defined as the fraction of 
the district workforce that is employed in the financial activities sector. We also add the number of 
financial institutions headquartered in the representative’s district. In addition, Mian et al. (2010) point 
out that the change in mortgage default rates between the fourth quarter of 2005 and the same quarter 
in 2007 captures constituency interests and predicts the vote on the EESA. Our related variable, 
capturing mortgage defaults rates, is constructed at the state-level.   
                                                     
11 The CCES 2008 study explicitly asked a sample of 32,800 respondents about their support for the “U.S. 
government $700 Billion Bank Bailout Plan.”  
12 Respondents could also choose “not sure” or could not answer this particular question.  
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In addition, we include the total PAC donations made by publicly-listed financial institutions 
to a politician that we consider a measure of a politician’s incentives to respond to the special interests 
of the financial service industry (Kroszner and Stratman, 1998; Milyo, Primo and Groseclose, 2000). 
We report both a long-term measure of donations that covers total PAC spending between 2003－2008 
as well as campaign donations during the 2007－2008 election cycle (Cooper et al., 2010). 
4. Results 
4.1 Voting in Congress on Proposals to Provide Support from Government to the Financial Sector 
 We first examine whether the personal wealth interests in the financial sector of representatives 
are associated with their votes on legislative proposal to deal with the deepening financial crisis in 
September and October of 2008. To illustrate our approach, consider figure 1 that uses data from the 
House’ vote on H.R. 3997 on September 29, 2008. The figure is a non-parametric plot of a politician’s 
wealth interest (measure by the change in net wealth) against the propensity to vote in favor of the bill. 
As the percentage loss in net wealth increases, so does the likelihood of supporting the intervention.  
 
 
FIGURE 1.—Propensity to vote in favor of EESA in the first House roll call on September 29, 2008 
against the percentage loss in the representatives’ Net Wealth. Negative numbers on the horizontal axis 
denote the percent gains in net wealth. Data source: The Office of the Clerk of the House and the Center 
for Responsive Politics. Dashed lines represent the 95% confidence intervals. 
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Thus, we predict that members with higher personal wealth interests are more likely to vote in 
favor of each of these proposals. Contemporary news reports suggested that at the second vote the 
leadership of both parties put considerable pressure on the membership to approve the government 
intervention; for this reason, the politician’s incentives might differ between the two votes.13 In 
particular, we believe that the first vote is a better test for our hypothesis about the role of personal 
wealth interests as politicians were under less pressure to follow the leadership’s vote to support the 
government intervention. As such, they could vote more according to their own preferences and 
interests.  
We estimate logit regressions of the propensity that a given politician votes in favor of each of 
the two legislative proposals. We report the results of these regressions in tables 2 (H.R. 3997) and 3 
(H.R. 1424). The dependent variable takes the value of one if a representative votes for the proposal 
(Yea) and zero otherwise (Nay). We seek to explain variation in voting by differences in personal wealth 
interests among representatives. Each column in the table reports the results for different measures of 
personal wealth interests, moving from conservative estimates based on the dollar amount of asset 
holdings in financial institutions (column 3) to more encompassing estimates based on the politicians 
net wealth (columns 6-7). Note that for variables based on dollar amounts, we use a logarithmic 
transformation. However, our main specification simply uses an indicator variable that takes the value 
of one if a politician invests in the financial sector, and zero otherwise (columns 1-2). We include state 
fixed effects in each but the first regression of each vote (in column 1) and report robust standard errors 
in parentheses.14 15  
 The regressions disclose a strong association between the preferred measures of personal wealth 
interests and voting in favor of either of the two bills. A representative who is an investor in the financial 
sector is about 60% more likely to vote for the government intervention proposal. The predicted 
                                                     
13 http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/02/business/02bailout.html  
14 Clustering standard errors by state does not materially affect inferences, but reduces the number of observations 
available for estimation.  
15 The number of observations varies across columns. The House represents 435 districts, but at the time of the 
voting, there was one vacancy (Ohio’s 11th district). One representative (G. Weller, R) did not vote on HR 3997 
due to “family matters”, but did vote on HR 1424. When we include state fixed effects, observations are dropped 
in those cases where the state indicator perfectly predicts either the yea or the nay votes. Missing data on some of 
the personal wealth proxies may further reduce the dataset.  
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probability to vote “Yea” in the initial (final) vote is 67% (73%) for financial sector investors, whereas 
for non-investors in the financial sector the predicted probability is 41% (54%).  
 We add a set of controls that intends to capture a politician’s voting incentives other than those 
related to personal wealth. Specifically, consistent with prior research, we add a set of variables that 
captures the voters’ interests in each representative’s district as well as a variable that measures the 
importance of special interest groups in financing the politician’s election campaigns. We find that the 
incentives deriving from the conflicting interests of a given politician’s electorate (measured as the 
percentage of voters in a district who oppose the government’s intervention) are significantly negatively 
associated with the likelihood that a representative votes for the proposals in particular in the vote on 
H.R. 1424. However, this association is weaker in estimates for the initial bill once we control for state 
fixed effects, which suggests that state-wide voter sentiment on the initial bailout proposal dominates 
variation between districts within a state. Measured by the number of financial institutions in a given 
representative’s district as well as by the fraction of the workforce in the financial sector, voter interests 
seem to play a bigger role in the second vote. We find some evidence, consistent with Mian et al. (2010), 
that politicians who represent voters from areas with high mortgage default rates tend to support the 
government intervention more. Mian et al. (2010) measure default rates at the district level and 
(reflecting their higher precision for this variable) obtain stronger results. We find little evidence that 
donations by the financial sector to the election campaigns of House members are positively associated 
with their propensity to vote in favor of the initial bill. However, the association with campaign 
donations is stronger in the second vote.  
We also add a series of controls in each regression that comprises the first dimension of the 
DW Nominate ideology score of each politician, which measures their conservatism (Poole and 
Rosenthal, 2007), their party affiliation, the victory margin over the closest competitor in the most 
recent congressional election, and the number of terms served in Congress (see, e.g., Kau, Keenan and 
Rubin, 1982). We add further controls to reflect whether the representative served on a finance-related 
committee, is not running for reelection in 2008, obtains a job in the finance sector after the 2008 
election, and for their asset holdings in non-financial stocks. We find that of these political controls, the 
number of terms served (positively) and the Republican party affiliation (negatively) are associated with 
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the initial vote. We also find that politicians who are not running for reelection are more likely to support 
the government intervention in both H.R. 3997 and 1424.  
Consistent with Mian et al. (2010), we include a range of census controls to capture 
heterogeneity in the representative’s district. In unreported tests, we also control for the gender of 
politicians as prior studies have documented that women have different investment preferences than 
men (Barber and Odean, 2001).16 Including gender does not change the inferences for our variables of 
interest and the coefficient on gender never attains significance.    
Do asset holdings proxy for latent connections between politicians and financial institutions? 
In table 4, we address the possibility that politicians’ asset holdings in a firm are a proxy for 
their (latent) connections to the firm. The idea, first proposed in Tahoun (2014) is that asset holdings 
are a way for politicians to signal their interest in forming a relation with the firm.  Thus, it is possible 
that our measure of personal wealth interests simply captures the quid-pro-quo relation between firms 
and politicians documented earlier in Tahoun (2014). To examine whether our findings are merely a 
manifestation of these earlier described channel or a separate economic force, we compute a measure 
in the spirit of Tahoun (2014) that captures the elasticity of the politician’s asset holdings to campaign 
donations. Note that while the original Tahoun construct is measured at the firm-level, our adaption 
constructs the measure at the politician level, making it amendable to inclusion in our politician-level 
regressions reported in table 2. Specifically, we compute the “investment-PAC sensitivity” as follows. 
We estimate a politician specific-coefficient obtained from regressing the stock ownership by politician 
i in bank j at time t on the political donations received by politician i from bank j at time t. To estimate 
this politician-level regression, we use the Tahoun (2014) dataset, which covers the period 2004-2007 
but restrict the sample to financial stocks. Our construct is higher when a larger proportion of the 
politician’s assets are explained by PAC donations. We first add this variable to our standard set of 
controls (including state fixed effects) and show a positive association with the vote on H.R. 3997 (but 
not with the vote on H.R. 1424). We then include our preferred proxy for personal wealth interests 
(“investor in financial sector”) and show that our estimates (in columns 2 and 6 remain very similar in 
                                                     
16 The age of a politician is another potentially important control. We do not include age, however, because it is 
highly correlated with the politician’s number of terms served in office. 
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size to what we reported in tables 2 and 3. In addition, we no longer find a significant association 
between the investment-PAC sensitivity and either vote. We conclude from these tests that the 
association between personal wealth interests and the vote is distinct from those mechanisms described 
in Tahoun (2014). Next, we construct another version of the Tahoun measure, but now use the lobbying 
expenditure of firms rather than the campaign donations to compute the sensitivity of a given 
politician’s asset holdings. We use lobbying expenditures because some authors (Kim, 2015) have 
argued that these expenditures represent a measure of influence that is less constrained by legal 
limitations compared with campaign (PAC) donations. When we include the lobby-expenditure version 
of the Tahoun measure in our regression in table 4 (column 4), it is statistically significant, negatively 
associated with the vote on H.R. 3997 (at p< 0.05), but does not materially affect our variable of interest 
(“investor in financial sector), which remains significantly positively associated with the vote at p < 
0.001.  Together these findings suggest that the documented correlation between asset holdings and the 
voting on EESA is not picking up a possible quid-pro-quo relation between politicians and firms.  
Robustness check 
Our measure of voter opposition to the bailout is based on survey data collected in October-
November 2008. Ideally, our measure of voter opposition should reflect opinions of constituents before 
the politicians voted on the EESA. Our alternative proxy is based on opinion data collected before the 
vote (in September 2008) but it is less precise as it is only available at the state level (for the 48 
contiguous states) rather than at the congressional district level. To investigate whether our main results 
are affected by using post hoc voter opinion data, we run a (untabulated) regression in which we 
substitute the original district-level voter opinion proxy with the pre-EESA alternative. Specifically, we 
use two questions from the Pew Research Institute survey (Based on what you have read and heard, do 
you think the government is doing an excellent, good, only fair or poor job of handling the financial 
problems of Wall Street? and As you may know, the government is potentially investing billions to try 
and keep financial institutions and markets secure. Do you think this is the right thing or the wrong 
thing for the government to be doing?). Higher scores on these questions imply more voter opposition. 
Our inferences regarding personal wealth interests are not influenced by the choice of voter opinion 
proxy in either vote.    
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4.2 Isolating Politicians’ Wealth-Sensitivity from Preferences for Financial Institutions 
 A politician’s asset holdings are likely endogenous and reflect unobserved heterogeneity. 
Consequently, the logit estimations of the relation between the voting behavior and the personal wealth 
sensitivity to the financial sector might be driven by this heterogeneity rather than by the incentives 
corresponding to personal wealth. In particular, we need to establish that politicians’ preferences for the 
government’s intervention are not systematically related with their preferences to hold stocks (or 
otherwise expose their personal wealth to the vicissitudes of the financial sector). Unobserved belief in 
financial institutions causes a correlated omitted variable problem that undermines our ability to 
attribute our findings on the voting behavior to wealth sensitivity. One way to address this problem is 
to add the observable characteristics of politicians that are likely related to those unobserved preferences 
for or belief in the financial sector. An alternative approach, which we use later in this subsection, is to 
exploit a random source of financial wealth in the politicians’ portfolios.  
 We first use the empirical strategy of adding variables to our main specification that attempt to 
capture heterogeneity among politicians’ preferences for the financial sector. We consider politicians 
who held stock in the financial sector prior to December 2007 (i.e., in any of the years 2004, 2005, 
2006, and in part of 2007), but no longer owned any stocks in the sector as of January 1, 2008. We 
assume that these politicians are likely to share many of the unobserved characteristics with those 
members of Congress who continued (or started) to own financial sector stocks in 2008. In particular, 
both should share a belief in the importance of financial institutions. The two groups differ in one 
important dimension: whether they (still) own stocks during the crisis and can obtain private benefits 
from the government’s support of the sector. There are 56 representatives who are ex-financial sector 
investors. In part because almost half of these individuals hold the stocks for three years consecutively 
we assume that these individuals believe in the importance of the sector.  
 We further add controls for those representatives who have worked in the financial sector before 
their election to Congress and for those who have obtained a degree in finance or economics. Work 
experience or educational background might predispose politicians to have stronger preferences for 
investing in the financial sector as well as for government support of the sector. Next, we add a control 
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for representatives who serve on the House Financial Services Committee, as members of this 
committee might have stronger preferences for the financial sector than others in the House. 
 In table 3, we repeat the main regression specification in columns 1-5 (6-10) for the vote on 
H.R. 3997 (H.R. 1424), but now add controls for a politician’s preferences for the financial sector. We 
find very little evidence that any of these variables are associated with representatives’ voting behavior. 
Indeed, none of these control variables that capture financial-sector preferences is significantly related 
to the vote at the conventional levels. Nor is our estimate of the association between personal wealth 
sensitivity and the propensity to vote for the intervention significantly affected. In unreported tests, we 
show that when we drop the indicator variable for being an investor in the financial sector, we still do 
not obtain a significant association between any of the preference for the financial sector controls. We 
conclude that our results are not due to multicollinearity between these preference-related variables and 
the variable of interest. 
 Thus, our principal finding that personal wealth incentives are positively associated with the 
likelihood of a given representative voting in favor of the EESA holds even after conditioning on a wide 
range of observable characteristics. However, this approach does not completely eliminate the 
possibility that unobservable characteristics affect our results. For example, in our definition of 
“investor in financial sector”, we include a set of 27 politicians who only invest in financial institutions 
(i.e., these individuals do not invest in non-financial firms). It could be the case that these politicians 
have unobserved characteristics related to their beliefs about the financial sector that affect our 
inferences. For this reason, we compute an adjusted version of “Investor in financial sector” that 
requires politicians to not only invest in the financial sector, but also in non-financial firms. When we 
estimate our main specification with this adjusted version of our variable of interest (not tabulated), we 
find that the magnitude of the estimated coefficient increases (and its significance is unaffected). We 
conclude that the correlation we reported earlier is not due to politicians who only invest in financial 
institutions.  
To further probe the possible effect of omitted unobservable variables on our inferences, we 
compute an informal test statistic, suggested by Altonji, Elber and Taber (2005), to assess how large 
the effect of “selection on unobservables” would have to be to account for the entire estimate of the 
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coefficient on the proxy for personal wealth sensitivity. To fully explain the coefficient found on the 
variable “Investor in financial sector” in column 2 of table 2, selection on unobservables would have to 
be 3.46 times larger than selection on observables.   
 Next, we turn to an alternative approach to address the source of the omitted variables bias in 
our main regression. This approach uses a random source of variation in the politicians’ wealth. We 
collect data from the politicians’ personal finance disclosure to determine whether their spouses 
participate in a Defined Contribution (DC) plan. Conditional on the spouse’s participation, we compute 
the annual return over the year 2008 reported on this plan. We multiply the annual return by -1, to obtain 
a measure that is increasing in the losses during 2008, to ease comparison with our prior financial wealth 
interest proxies. We also compute an indicator variable “DC plan loss” that takes the value of one if the 
annual return on the spousal pension plan is negative. We find that the average return on spousal DC 
plans is 0.12 (median = 0.00) and that more than 50 percent of spousal DC plans have a positive return 
(unreported). These two new personal wealth interest measures are arguably uncorrelated with other 
determinants of voting behavior for two reasons. First, we condition on the spouse’s decision to 
participate in a plan, rather than the politician’s. Thus, the participation decision should be independent 
from the politician’s beliefs.17 Second, returns on pension plans are exogenous, and thus, conditional 
on participating in the plan, variation in these returns produce a personal wealth interest measure that is 
unaffected by beliefs.   
 Table 6 presents the results of estimating the main regression specification, but now using the 
two new personal wealth interest variables. We estimate these logit regressions in the sample of spouses 
who disclose their participation in DC pension plans (n=84). Given our extensive range of control 
variables, we do not report results based on state fixed effects estimation. We find a significantly 
positive association between the (negative) annual return on the spousal pension plan and the 
politician’s vote for the government intervention on H.R. 3997. Consistent with this finding, we also 
report a significant positive association between the indicator variable reflecting a loss (i.e., negative 
annual returns) on the spousal DC plan and the voting behavior. Using this latter variable, we estimate 
                                                     
17 The correlation between Investor in the financial sector and Return on spousal DC plans equals -0.25 (p<0.05). 
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that the predicted probability of voting in favor of the EESA is about 23 percent larger for politicians 
whose spouses report a loss on their plan than for politicians with spouses who disclose positive annual 
DC plan returns (based on estimates for the largest possible sample). We find similar results for the vote 
on H.R. 1424 albeit that the estimated coefficient on the “return on spousal DC plan” is a little smaller 
in magnitude and only marginally significant (p = 0.13).  
 Our tests, concentrated on the returns on spousal DC plans, exploit a shock to the politician’s 
financial wealth that is unlikely to be correlated with other determinants of voting behavior (such as 
beliefs in the financial sector). Our evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that personal wealth 
interests per se are a potential explanation for the voting on the EESA.  
 We add two further tests that might help improve the attribution of the correlation between 
voting and asset holdings to personal wealth interests. We first use nearest neighborhood matching 
(Abadie and Imbens, 2006; Abadie and Imbens, 2011) to estimate the association between the preferred 
measure of personal wealth (“Investor in financial sector”) and voting. We match politicians based on 
the campaign donations from financial institutions and the degree of voters’ opposition against the 
EESA in their district. In particular, we want to separate the personal wealth interest from ideology. We 
therefore require an exact match on party affiliation as well as a test in which we require that politicians 
be matched on their ideology (in addition to voter opposition and campaign donations), Our (bias-
corrected) estimate of the average treatment effect, reported in table 7, equals 0.116 (p<0.05) when 
requiring an exact match on party affiliation, which suggest that investors in the financial sector are 
11.6 percent more likely to vote in favor of the H.R. 3997 than similar politicians who do not invest in 
the financial sector. Likewise, when matching politicians on the DW-Nominate ideology score, we find 
an average treatment effect of 0.131 (p=0.02). We obtain very similar results for the House vote on H.R. 
1424. Together, these results suggest a sizeable difference related to being an investor in the financial 
sector for politicians who are very similar in terms of their ideology and their constituency and special 
interests.  
 Second, we examine whether personal wealth interests are associated with other roll call votes 
during the same Congress. We concentrate on those roll call votes for which we also have data on voter 
opposition to the legislation in a given representative’s district (from the 2008 CCES survey). The 
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resulting set of roll calls span a variety of topics and take place in 2007, i.e., in the first session of the 
110th Congress.18 Consequently, we use information on asset holdings at the start of 2007 in our tests. 
Our prediction is that our preferred measure “Investor in financial sector” is associated with those roll 
calls that potentially affect the politician’s asset holdings in financial institutions but not with other 
votes. Using the full set of control variables and including state fixed effects, we find no consistent 
association between any of these roll calls and our preferred measure.  Note that one of these roll calls 
concerns the extension of NAFTA to include Peru and Columbia. Beliefs in the importance of the 
financial institutions are plausibly associated with beliefs in free trade. Yet, our personal wealth measure 
is not associated with the vote in favor of this bill.   
4.3 Cross-sectional tests 
In this subsection, we examine the cross-sectional heterogeneity in the correlation between 
being an investor in the financial sector and EESA voting. In particular, we examine how this correlation 
varies across different values of the variables that control for voter interests, special interests.   
These analyses address the question of how important personal wealth interests are relative to 
politicians’ other incentives. In particular, politicians face demands from voters and election campaign 
contributors that they need to balance against their narrow self-interest if they desire to remain in office 
for another term. Therefore, personal wealth incentives are strongest in the absence of conflicting 
interests from voters or from special interests. To test this prediction, we examine how the association 
between voting and asset holdings in the financial sector depends on the degree of the voters’ opposition 
against the EESA in the representative’s district. Campaign donations from financial institutions can 
represent their special interests. As both politicians who hold assets in the financial sector as well as 
donors from the sector presumably would stand to benefit from the EESA, their interests do not 
necessarily conflict. A priori then, it is not clear if and how the presence of special interest affects the 
relative importance of personal wealth interests or constituency interests.  
                                                     
18 Specifically, we examine Roll Call vote # 330, (H.R. 2237), # 18 (H.R. 2), # 443 (S. 5), # 437 (H.R. 6304), # 
906 (H.R. 976), # 832 (H.R. 3221), and # 1060 (H.R. 3688). The CCES dataset also contains information about 
voter support for H.J.Res. 88. This roll call, however, took place during the 109th Congress.   
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 We examine these issues more closely in a logit regression that includes interactions of our 
variable of interest (“Investor in financial sector”) with (one-by-one) dichotomized versions of voter 
and special interest proxies. We turn the variables that enter into the interaction into indicator variables 
(which take the value of one if their score is above the median, zero otherwise) for ease of interpretation. 
Mindful of Ai and Norton’s (2003) warning that coefficients and standard errors in logit regressions are 
difficult to interpret in the presence of interaction effects, we present our evidence in the form of average 
marginal effects in table 8.19 For brevity and because the results do not vary much across proxies, we 
report only one proxy for voter and special interests each. 
Perhaps the most important takeaway from table 8 is that the association between personal 
wealth interests and voting remains economically significant even in the presence of competing 
interests. Most clearly, this conclusion is supported by the row “double difference”, which provides a 
test of the differential marginal effect of being an investor in the financial sector versus being a non-
investor in the financial sector comparing this difference across above and below the median values of 
the interacting variable. For example, the double difference reported in column (1) of table 8 equals 
0.14 (s.e. = 0.12), which is the difference between the differential marginal effect of being an investor 
in the financial sector for politicians in districts where the percentage of voters opposing the bank 
bailout is below the median (0.29) and the differential marginal effect for politicians in districts with 
above the median opposition against the bailout (0.43). Although some of these double differences are 
economically meaningful, we do not find that they are statistically significant. In other words, having 
assets in the financial sector matters for voting regardless of the politician facing high or low voter 
opposition to the bank bailout or receiving high or low campaign contributions from the financial sector. 
Whereas the double differences do not attain significance, it is worthwhile to note that the 
estimates of the levels of average marginal effects in each of the cells in table 8 conform to economic 
intuition. For example, politicians who receive more PAC donations by the financial sector are likely 
to vote in favor of the EESA (0.48) and when they are also an investor in the financial sector, this 
likelihood is even higher (0.79). For politicians with few financial sector donors, we also find a 
                                                     
19 We obtain very similar results (unreported) in a linear probability model. 
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significant higher likelihood to vote in favor of the EESA when they are investors in the financial sector 
(0.77), but without being investors their likelihood is markedly lower (0.31).  
For the second House vote (on H.R. 1424), our results support the idea that voter interests affect 
the correlation between being an investor in the financial sector and voting. In particular, we find 
significant double differences in column 3 for the percentage of voters opposing bank bailout (0.18, s.e. 
= 0.11), respectively. When the percentage of voter opposition to the bailout is relatively low, the 
differential marginal effect of being an investor in the financial sector is 0.13, whereas in districts with 
strong voter opposition, the differential marginal effect is 0.32. Thus, we find that in districts where 
voters are not too strongly against the bailout, both investors and non-investors in the financial sector 
are likely to vote in favor of the bailout. However, if the voters are strongly opposed to the bailout, we 
find that non-investors are much less likely than investors to vote in favor of the bailout (0.44 vs. 0.76). 
Thus, for the second House vote, the personal wealth interests matter in particular when politician and 
voter interests are not aligned. 
We further probe the effect of incentives coming from voters and special interest in unreported 
tests, in which we use data on whether an incumbent faces an uncontested re-election in November 
2008. Uncontested elections reduce pressures on politicians to vote according to the wishes of special 
interests and constituents. As they run unopposed, these incumbents do not have to cater to their 
constituency’s preferences because even if they support unpopular policies the electoral backlash will 
be small. Similarly, uncontested incumbents rely less on campaign donations from special interests. By 
contrasting contested versus uncontested elections, we provide another perspective on how important 
personal wealth interests are in explaining voting behavior in the presence (absence) of competing 
interests.  
We interact the indicator variable for asset holdings in the financial sector (i.e., our preferred 
personal wealth sensitivity measure) with an indicator variable that takes the value of one for 
representatives who are uncontested in the upcoming election. We compute the marginal effects from 
the personal wealth sensitivity and show that the propensity to vote in favor of the EESA is 32.3 percent 
higher for politicians who hold assets in the financial sector than for those who do not in the group of 
uncontested elections (p = .07). In contested elections, the differential propensity to vote in favor 
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between investors and non-investors equals, in contrast, to 18.5 percent (p < .01). We conclude from 
this finding that when voter incentives are weak, the correlation between personal wealth interest and 
the vote is substantial. However, even when competing (i.e., voter) interest are present, personal wealth 
interest continue to be significantly correlated with voting by politicians.  
4.4 The Senate Vote on H.R. 1424 
We have highlighted the House vote in our tests thus far. We have done so for three reasons. 
First, the Senate vote on October 1, was much different from the initial House vote because in the 
intervening days it became increasingly clear what the economic consequences might be if Congress 
were not to approve the bill. Senators were very much involved in crafting a “package” that would have 
sufficient bi-partisan support when the proposal was put to the vote in the Senate. In all, individual 
members likely experienced less leeway to depart from approved party policy (Hitt and Lueck, 2008). 
Thus, personal wealth interests would have to be strong to dominate these political realities. Second, 
some earlier studies suggest that senators, more than House members, are driven by policy preferences 
and not by electoral or special interests (Diermeier et al., 2005).20 If so, then we would not necessarily 
expect personal wealth interests to matter much.  Further, as Mian et al. (2010) point out, the sample 
for the senate is smaller than for the House, which potentially reduces the power of our tests. For this 
reason, we conduct the tests for the Senate using a limited set of control variables, which include the 
percentage of voters opposing bank bailouts in the state, the (logarithm of) long term PAC donations 
by the financial sector, as well as the party affiliation of senators, their seniority, the victory margin in 
the previous election, and whether they have asset holdings in the non-financial sector.  
In unreported tests, we find the log of net wealth is positively associated with the vote, the 
estimate of 0.32 (z = 1.95), corresponds with an average marginal effect of approximately 0.05 (z = 
                                                     
20 The fact that senators represent a whole state might be one possible explanation for the finding in prior work 
that they are more strongly driven by policy preferences than House members (see, e.g., Abramowitz, 1980; 
Bafumi and Herron, 2010; Levitt, 1996 1996). We investigate this possibility by examining whether House 
members from states with a single representative in the House behave more like senators. We run our preferred 
regression specification augmented with an indicator variable that takes the value of one for each of the seven 
single representative states, and zero otherwise. We interact this new variable with our personal wealth proxy and 
drop the state fixed effects. In unreported results, we do not find an attenuation of the estimate of personal wealth 
interests and we also do not find a significant simple effect for single representative states. Thus, it would not 
appear that the policy over wealth preferences of senators stems from the latter representing the whole state. 
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2.15). This finding implies that a one-standard deviation change in the log of net wealth increases the 
propensity to vote in favor of the bill by about 8 percent. We do not find, however, a significant 
correlation between personal wealth interests and the vote for the remaining proxies.  
A comparison between the two House votes and the Senate vote suggests that information about 
the gravity of the crisis spread at a dramatic pace in this short period. One possible explanation for the 
pattern we find across the three votes is that representatives who were investors in financial institutions 
had better information about the gravity of the crisis than the other representatives (perhaps by 
observing the loss of value in their own holdings). Thus, it is possible that asset holdings do not reflect 
a potential conflict of interest, but are simply a means by which politicians become better informed 
about whether government intervention is optimal for the economy.  
Although on average the voting in the Senate does not appear to be associated with personal 
wealth interests, the possibility exists that asset holdings under specific conditions are correlated with 
voting. We examine this possibility by conditioning the relation on the voters’ opposition against the 
EESA in each state. Specifically, we compute the marginal effects of the personal wealth interests by 
using the indicator measure of whether a senator holds assets in the financial sector on the Senate vote 
for the states with high voter opposition and for the states with low voter opposition. We find that the 
marginal effect of personal wealth interests is 0.15 (p = 0.07) for senators who face voters with little 
opposition and –0.09 (p > 0.10) for those representing states in which voters strongly oppose the EESA. 
Thus, the propensity to vote in favor in the Senate is positively associated with personal wealth interests 
when other incentives are not too strong.  
E. Robustness: Transaction Data  
 We use data on the 2008 opening balance of asset holdings of members of Congress to compute 
our personal wealth sensitivity proxies. Because the first vote did not take place until September 29th, 
2008, the possibility exists that members divested their holdings or bought more stock in financial 
institutions in the months before the votes. If so, then our proxies based on the opening balance would 
not be very clean. We use transactions data from the Financial Disclosure Report to reconstruct the 
portfolio holdings of each politician on each of the voting days (i.e., September 29th, October 1st, and 
October 3, 2008). We then check the sensitivity of the results reported in tables 2 and 3 to the use of the 
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modified proxies. We find very much the same results and none of the inferences are changed. That 
said, these transaction data are not very clean. Politicians, for example, do not always report the date on 
which a purchase or sale occurred. For a significant proportion of transactions, then, we cannot be sure 
whether they occurred before or after the roll call on the bailout proposals. For this reason, we use the 
beginning balance holdings data for our main tests. 
5. Conclusion 
 In this paper, we exploit a new dataset with details on the personal wealth of members of 
Congress to demonstrate that politicians’ personal wealth interests are correlated with their voting 
behavior. In particular, we use this dataset to document voting behavior on key legislative proposals to 
provide the government’s support to the financial sector during the crisis of 2008. Although prior studies 
document that politicians respond to the interests of their constituency and pressure groups, it has gone 
virtually unnoticed that they are also investors. As investors, part of their wealth rests with firms whose 
wellbeing falls under their legislative influence. As such, our findings potentially suggest that the 
standard economic model of politician voting, which emphasizes the incentives deriving from electoral 
prospects and the utility gained from seeing one’s ideology reflected in policies, should be augmented 
by a further economically meaningful factor: the personal wealth interests of a given politician.  
 We show that personal wealth interests are an important correlate of the voting behavior of 
politicians by examining the impact of personal wealth in settings with varying degrees of competing 
interests from voters and special interest groups. We report that personal wealth interests are correlated 
with a given politician’s behavior in an economically meaningful way even when the voters strongly 
oppose the government’s intervention. Indeed, the effect of personal wealth interests in general does 
not seem to depend much on the magnitude of the other determinants of the politician’s vote. 
Congress recognizes that politicians might use their office to further their personal finances. 
Doing so is not necessarily illegal. Indeed, federal law defines a conflict of interest quite narrowly and, 
in general, cases in which politicians support a decision that yields personal financial benefits do not 
qualify as conflicts of interest as long as the decision benefits many, and not just the member in question 
(Committee on Standards of Official Conduct, 2008). The House ethics manual even states that 
“Members of Congress frequently maintain economic interests that merge or correspond with the 
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interests of their constituents. This community of interests … is therefore inevitable and unavoidable” 
(Committee on Standards of Official Conduct, 2008, p. 251). However, we show that personal financial 
interests are also correlated with voting behavior when the interests of voters and representatives 
conflict. Former House Speaker Nancy Pelosi has argued “when there’s a thought of conflict of interest 
between a member’s financial holdings and the government bailouts then the member should divest”. 
A number of high-profile ethics violations emphasizes that at least some constituencies might not be 
well represented despite this advice.21 Congress recently approved the Stop Trading on Congressional 
Knowledge Act aimed to prevent members from taking advantage of non-public information gleaned 
from their activities as legislators. There is currently little evidence that members of Congress are indeed 
able to profit from confidential information (Ziobrowski et al., 2004), but our paper shows that a more 
direct way is available to politicians to protect their financial interests through their office. And thus 
while we refrain from drawing direct welfare implications from our results, we do note that strong 
political institutions are necessary for keeping representatives accountable to their voters and for 
preventing the abuse of power (Querubin and Snyder, 2013). Accountability, in turn, requires that voters 
have sufficient information about what explains a politician’s actions (Besley and Prat, 2006). Our study 
suggests that constituents need to pay attention to the asset holdings of their representatives in relation 
to their work in Congress. 
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APPENDIX A: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
 
Variable definitions  
  
House vote on H.R. 3997 Indicator variable that takes the value of unity if 
a given representative votes Yea on H.R. 3997 
and zero otherwise 
House vote on H.R. 1424 Indicator variable that takes the value of unity if 
a given representative votes Yea on H.R. 1424 
and zero otherwise 
Equity investment in financial sector Dollar amount of a representative’s disclosed 
asset holdings in publicly listed banks, savings 
associations, bank-holding companies, and 
savings and loan holding companies, as well as 
life insurance companies trading on the NYSE, 
Amex, or the NASDAQ  
Expected losses due to investment in financial 
sector 
Number of shares a representative holds in 
financial institutions at the beginning of 2008 
multiplied by each of these shares’ change in 
stock price on September 29, 2008. 
Expected losses due to participation in the stock 
market 
Number of shares a representative holds in 
financial institutions and in nonfinancial S&P 
500 firms multiplied by each of these shares’ 
change in stock price on September 29, 2008. 
Percentage loss in net wealth in 2008 Percent change in a representative’s net wealth 
during 2008. Net wealth is defined as total 
assets minus total liabilities reported in the 
representative’s personal finance disclosures and 
includes bond holdings and real estate. 
Net wealth at the beginning of 2008 Dollar amount of the total net wealth at the 
beginning of 2008 (includes bond holdings and 
real estate). 
Percentage voters opposed to bank bailout Percentage of voters in a congressional district 
that indicates in the CCES 2008 survey that 
they, in principle, oppose legislation on the 
government’s intervention in the financial 
sector. 
Fraction of workforce employed in financial 
sector 
Fraction of the district workforce that is 
employed in the financial activities sector.  
Number of financial institutions Number of financial institutions headquartered 
in a given representative’s district. 
Change in mortgage default rates 2005Q4-
2007Q4 
Change in mortgage default rates between the 
fourth quarter of 2005 and the same quarter in 
2007 measured at the state level. 
Long term PAC donations by financial sector Total PAC donations made by publicly listed 
financial institutions to a given politician 
between 2003 and 2008. 
Election cycle 2006-08 PAC donations by 
financial sector 
Total PAC donations made by publicly listed 
financial institutions to a given politician during 
election cycle 2006-2008. 
DW Nominate ideology score First dimension of the DW Nominate ideology 
score for a given politician (Poole and 
Rosenthal, 2007). 
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Party affiliation is Republican Indicator variable that takes the value of unity if 
the politician is affiliated with the Republican 
Party and zero otherwise 
Victory margin previous election Victory margin over the closest competitor in 
the most recent congressional election for a 
given representative. 
Number of terms served Number of terms served in Congress by a given 
representative. 
Finance committee member Indicator variable that takes the value of unity if 
a given representative served on a finance-
related committee and zero otherwise. Finance-
related committees include the Senate Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Senate Finance, 
and the House Financial Services Committees. 
Post-congress work in finance sector Indicator variable that takes the value of unity if 
a given representative takes a job in the finance 
sector after the 2008 election 
Not running for reelection Indicator variable that takes the value of unity if 
a given representative is not running for 
reelection in 2008 and zero otherwise. 
Equity investor in non-financial sector Indicator variable that takes the value of unity if 
a given representative owns equity in non-
financial S&P 500 firms 
Finance-related education Indicator variable that takes the value of unity if 
a given representative has obtained a degree in 
finance or economics and zero otherwise. 
Previous employment in financial sector Indicator variable that takes the value of unity if 
a given representative has worked in the 
financial sector prior to their election to 
Congress and zero otherwise. 
Percentage Hispanic The fraction of households that are Hispanic in a 
given representative’s district. 
Percentage Black The fraction of households that are black in a 
given representative’s district. 
Log(median household income) Natural logarithm of the median household 
income in a given representative’s district. 
Percentage in poverty The fraction of households that are in poverty 
(according to the Census Bureau definition) in a 
given representative’s district. 
Percentage less than high school education The fraction of the population in a given 
representative’s district without high school 
attainment  
Percentage high school education The fraction of the population in a given 
representative’s district with high school 
attainment 
Return on spousal DC plan The annual return over 2008 on the IRA plan of 
the spouse of a given representative. 
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TABLE 1 
SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 
 
Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
 Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
 
Members of the House, N = 434 
 
Investors in financial sector  Non-Investors in financial sector 
 N = 126  N = 308 
        
Yea vote on H.R. 3997＃ 0.58 1.00 0.50  0.43 0.00 0.50 
Yea vote on H.R. 1424＃ 0.70 1.00 0.46  0.57 1.00 0.50 
        
Measures of personal wealth interests        
Equity investment in financial sector (× $1,000) 388.06 32.84 1803.34  - - - 
Expected losses due to investment in financial sector (× $1,000) 40.34 4.46 177.82  - - - 
Expected losses due to participation in stock market (× $1,000) 175.95 13.25 735.21  1.60 0.00 12.43 
Percentage loss in net wealth in 2008§   13.41 11.71 33.55  –15.46 2.63 85.43 
Net wealth at the beginning of 2008 (× $1,000) 12223.87 2306.25 41816.23  2651.70 489.76 19815.58 
        
Measures of voter interest        
Percentage voters opposed to bank bailout (district) 72.72 74.51 9.41  71.92 73.84 9.51 
Fraction of workforce employed in financial sector (district) 5.01 4.41 2.07  4.90 4.43 2.02 
Number of financial institutions (district) 1.29 1.00 1.48  1.06 1.00 1.36 
Change in  mortgage default rates 2005Q4-2007Q4 (state) 0.91 1.12 2.07  1.21 1.19 1.94 
        
Measures of special interest (election campaign contributions)        
Long-term PAC donations by financial sector (× $1,000) 46.21 25.50 56.60  37.23 14.00 61.57 
Election cycle 2006-08 PAC donations by financial sector (× $1,000) 19.77 8.00 26.13  15.55 4.55 26.70 
        
Political controls        
DW Nominate ideology score 0.05 –0.13 0.48  0.02 –0.19 0.52 
Party affiliation is republican＃ 0.47 0.00 0.50  0.46 0.00 0.50 
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Victory margin previous election 33.16 30.00 24.82  36.64 32.00 26.78 
Number of terms served  6.14 6.00 4.61  5.93 5.50 4.31 
Finance committee member＃ 0.21 0.00 0.41  0.16 0.00 0.37 
Post-congress work in finance sector#  0.15 0.00 0.36  0.11 0.00 0.32 
Not running for reelection# 0.06 0.00 0.23  0.06 0.00 0.23 
Equity investor in non-financial sector＃ 0.79 1.00 0.41  0.24 0.00 0.43 
Finance-related education＃ 0.20 0.00 0.40  0.13 0.00 0.33 
Previous employment in financial sector＃ 0.18 0.00 0.39  0.13 0.00 0.33 
        
Census controls        
Percentage Hispanic 0.09 0.05 0.11  0.10 0.04 0.15 
Percentage Black 0.13 0.08 0.14  0.11 0.05 0.15 
Log(median household income) 10.69 10.63 0.26  10.68 10.66 0.24 
Percentage in poverty 0.12 0.11 0.05  0.13 0.11 0.06 
Percentage less than high school education 0.20 0.19 0.07  0.20 0.18 0.08 
Percentage high school education 0.28 0.29 0.07  0.29 0.29 0.06 
 
NOTE.—This table reports the summary statistics for the sample of members of the House who voted on H.R. 3997 and H.R. 1424. We split the sample based on whether a 
politician invested in publicly listed financial sector institutions at the beginning of 2008 (Investor in financial sector) or not (Non-investor in financial sector). At the time of 
the vote on the EESA, the House had one vacant seat.  See appendix A for variable definitions.  
The ＃denotes an indicator variable. 
§ Positive values denote a loss in net wealth in 2008 and negative values denote a gain in net wealth. 
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TABLE 2 
THE RELATION BETWEEN PERSONAL WEALTH INTERESTS AND THE HOUSE VOTE ON H.R. 3997         
  House Vote on H.R. 3997 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
Investor in 
financial sector 
Investor in 
financial sector 
Log(Equity investment in 
financial sector) 
Log(Expected losses  
due to investment in 
financial sector) 
Log(Expected losses 
due 
 to participation in 
stock market) 
Percentage 
loss 
 in net wealth 
in 2008 
Log(Net wealth 
at 
 the beginning 
of 2009) 
                
Personal wealth interest proxy 1.02*** 1.70*** 0.14*** 0.15*** 0.13*** 0.01*** 0.11* 
 (0.32) (0.39) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.00) (0.06) 
Controls for voter interests       
Change in mortgage default rates 
2005Q4-2007Q4 0.10       
 (0.06)       
Number of financial institutions  0.12 0.18* 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.14 
 (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) 
Fraction of constituency working 
in financial sector  0.09 0.15* 0.15* 0.14 0.13 0.16* 0.12 
 (0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Percentage of voters opposing 
bank bailout  –0.04*** –0.04** –0.04* –0.03* –0.03 –0.02 –0.03 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Control for special interests       
Log(Long term PAC donations by 
financial sector) 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 
 (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Political controls        
DW Nominate 0.11 –0.07 0.05 –0.04 –0.15 –0.12 –0.22 
 (0.63) (0.81) (0.82) (0.80) (0.78) (0.79) (0.79) 
Party affiliation is Republican –1.38** –1.76** –1.90** –1.76** –1.54** –1.46** –1.38** 
 (0.63) (0.73) (0.74) (0.73) (0.71) (0.73) (0.70) 
Victory margin in previous 
election 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 –0.00 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Number of terms served 0.08*** 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.11*** 0.09*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Finance committee member 0.07 0.05 0.02 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.07 
 (0.29) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.34) (0.37) (0.35) 
Post congress work in finance 
sector 0.14 0.10 0.17 0.20 0.29 0.28 0.25 
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 (0.34) (0.42) (0.40) (0.41) (0.41) (0.41) (0.40) 
Not running for reelection 2.81*** 3.82*** 3.75*** 3.80*** 3.39*** 3.79*** 3.24*** 
 (0.76) (1.12) (1.09) (1.20) (1.22) (1.10) (1.08) 
Equity investor in non-financial 
sector –0.32 –0.85** –0.77** –0.60* –1.06** –0.09 –0.06 
 (0.29) (0.34) (0.33) (0.32) (0.48) (0.28) (0.28) 
Census controls        
Percentage Hispanic –4.20** –6.16** –6.47** –6.50*** –6.32*** –6.97*** –6.58** 
 (1.88) (2.57) (2.56) (2.51) (2.43) (2.68) (2.63) 
Percentage Black –4.33*** –7.19*** –7.42*** –7.46*** –7.53*** –7.08*** –6.19*** 
 (1.28) (1.86) (1.87) (1.85) (1.86) (2.05) (1.93) 
Percentage living in urban 
environment 0.30 1.86 1.96 1.97 2.48* 1.89 1.76 
 (0.94) (1.37) (1.36) (1.35) (1.36) (1.40) (1.37) 
Log(median household income) 2.76* 7.47*** 7.49*** 7.35*** 7.58*** 8.06*** 7.27*** 
 (1.46) (2.35) (2.35) (2.31) (2.22) (2.36) (2.31) 
Percentage in poverty 20.44*** 42.24*** 42.70*** 41.92*** 43.31*** 46.00*** 40.48*** 
 (7.58) (11.84) (11.88) (11.61) (11.45) (11.10) (11.81) 
Percentage less than high school 
education –0.55 –1.21 –0.74 –0.37 –0.47 0.65 0.49 
 (3.54) (4.98) (4.95) (4.86) (4.73) (5.03) (5.01) 
Percentage high school education 3.36 17.23*** 16.76*** 15.99** 16.93*** 14.46** 13.51** 
 (3.27) (6.53) (6.47) (6.34) (6.17) (6.63) (6.22)         
State fixed effects Excluded Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Observations 433 405 405 405 405 379 390 
Chi-squared 91.47 128.8 127.5 127 118.7 119.2 109.9 
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
              
Note.—This table reports politician-level logit regressions on the vote in favor of H.R. 3997 for measures of the sensitivity of personal wealth interests to the financial sector. 
In columns 6-7, we drop politicians who have a negative net wealth in 2008. We also dropped one representative who did not vote on H.R. 3997. Except for column 1, all 
models contain state fixed effects. Robust standard errors are included in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. See appendix A for variable definitions. 
* Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
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TABLE 3 
THE RELATION BETWEEN PERSONAL WEALTH INTERESTS AND THE HOUSE VOTE ON H.R. 1424         
  House Vote on H.R. 1424  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
Investor in 
financial 
sector 
Investor in 
financial 
sector 
Log(Equity 
investment in 
financial sector) 
Log(Expected losses 
due to investment in 
financial sector) 
Log(Expected losses 
due to participation in 
stock market) 
Percentage 
loss in net 
wealth in 2008 
Log(Net wealth 
at the beginning 
of 2009) 
                
Personal wealth interest 
proxy 0.76** 1.21*** 0.10*** 0.10** 0.09* 0.00 0.05 
 (0.32) (0.37) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.00) (0.06)        
Change in mortgage 
default rates 2005Q4-
2007Q4 0.07       
 (0.06)       
Number of financial 
institutions  0.10 0.21* 0.20* 0.20* 0.20* 0.21* 0.21* 
 (0.09) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
Fraction of constituency 
working in financial 
sector  0.23*** 0.30*** 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.28*** 0.28*** 0.27*** 
 (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Percentage of voters 
opposing bank bailout  –0.04** –0.05** –0.04** –0.04** –0.04** –0.03* –0.04** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)        
Log(Long term PAC 
donations by financial 
sector) 0.10* 0.13* 0.13** 0.13** 0.14** 0.14** 0.14** 
 (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Political controls        
DW Nominate –0.48 –0.51 –0.47 –0.50 –0.56 –0.66 –0.47 
 (0.71) (0.88) (0.88) (0.87) (0.85) (0.87) (0.84) 
Party affiliation is 
Republican –0.70 –1.01 –1.07 –1.03 –0.88 –0.71 –0.89 
 (0.66) (0.79) (0.79) (0.78) (0.76) (0.78) (0.75) 
Victory margin in 
previous election 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Number of terms served 0.03 0.05# 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Finance committee 
member –0.32 –0.49 –0.50 –0.48 –0.49 –0.58 –0.58 
 (0.31) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.38) (0.35) 
Post congress work in 
finance sector 0.04 0.25 0.29 0.32 0.37 0.35 0.42 
 (0.38) (0.45) (0.44) (0.45) (0.44) (0.44) (0.44)            
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Not running for reelection 2.59*** 2.87*** 2.82*** 2.89*** 2.68*** 2.52*** 2.57*** 
 (0.81) (0.89) (0.88) (0.95) (0.94) (0.88) (0.86) 
Equity investor in non-
financial sector –0.03 –0.30 –0.22 –0.12 –0.37 0.32 0.28 
 (0.29) (0.33) (0.33) (0.33) (0.50) (0.28) (0.29) 
Census controls        
Percentage Hispanic –4.13** –4.42** –4.52** –4.56** –4.50** –4.55** –4.20* 
 (1.62) (2.14) (2.15) (2.13) (2.09) (2.32) (2.23) 
Percentage Black –2.92* –4.26** –4.41** –4.45** –4.44** –5.11** –3.72* 
 (1.50) (2.03) (2.03) (2.01) (2.00) (2.27) (2.10) 
Percentage living in urban 
environment 1.31 2.37* 2.40* 2.41* 2.67* 2.26† 1.98 
 (0.96) (1.41) (1.41) (1.41) (1.40) (1.39) (1.40) 
Log(median household 
income) 3.54** 6.98*** 6.86*** 6.75*** 6.76*** 6.78*** 6.70*** 
 (1.53) (2.42) (2.42) (2.38) (2.37) (2.44) (2.35) 
Percentage in poverty 25.00*** 39.20*** 39.00*** 38.49*** 39.34*** 40.34*** 37.97*** 
 (8.59) (12.98) (13.01) (12.85) (12.88) (13.02) (12.82) 
Percentage less than high 
school education –0.16 –1.42 –1.35 –1.14 –1.48 –1.89 –1.45 
 (3.67) (4.99) (4.93) (4.87) (4.73) (4.81) (4.81) 
Percentage high school 
education 5.19 14.56** 14.02** 13.54** 13.49** 12.23* 11.77* 
 (3.67) (6.92) (6.82) (6.71) (6.63) (6.78) (6.66)         
State fixed effects Excluded Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Observations 434 411 411 411 411 385 396 
Chi-squared 90.21 133.1 129.5 129 119.4 110 112.2 
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
 
 
Note.—This table reports politician-level logit regressions on the vote in favor of H.R. 1424 for measures of the sensitivity of personal wealth interests to the financial sector. 
In columns 6-7, we drop politicians who have a negative net wealth in 2008. Except for column 1, all models contain state fixed effects. Robust standard errors are included in 
parentheses below the coefficient estimates. See appendix A for variable definitions. 
* Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
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TABLE 4 
VOTING IN FAVOR OF GOVERNMENT’S SUPPORT CONTROLLING FOR LATENT POLITICAL CONNECTIONS 
 
         
  HOUSE VOTE ON H.R. 3997 HOUSE VOTE ON H.R. 1424 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
              
Investor in financial sector  1.77***  1.96***  1.38***  1.30*** 
  (0.45)  (0.41)  (0.44)  (0.39) 
Investment-PAC sensitivity 0.73* –0.17   0.38 –0.41   
 (0.43) (0.53)   (0.43) (0.54)   
Investment-lobby expenditure sensitivity   –0.03 –0.101**   –0.01 –0.05 
   (0.04) (0.04)   (0.04) (0.05) 
         
Controls for voter and special interests Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Political controls Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Census controls Included Included Included Included  Included Included Included Included  
State fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Observations 405 405 405 405 411 411 411 411 
Chi-squared 119.84 129.6 117.52 133.51 120.31 134.06 119.42 134.95 
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
Note: This table reports on variations of the main specification to explain the House vote on the EESA. In columns (1) and (5) we add the Tahoun Investment-
PAC sensitivity proxy to the set of control variables, but drop the variable of interest (Investor in financial sector). In columns (2) and (6) we include the Tahoun 
proxy together with the variable of interest (Investor in financial sector). Columns (3-4) and (7-8) add the Investment-lobby expenditure variable to the set of 
controls and then to the preferred specification together with the variable of interest. See appendix A for variable definitions. Robust standard errors are reported 
in parentheses.  
* Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
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TABLE 5 
UNOBSERVED PREFERENCES FOR THE FINANCIAL SECTOR 
     
 
    
  HOUSE VOTE ON H.R. 3997 HOUSE VOTE ON H.R. 1424 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
                      
Investor in financial sector 1.84*** 1.71*** 1.70*** 1.70*** 1.86*** 1.34*** 1.19*** 1.18*** 1.21*** 1.30*** 
 (0.41) (0.40) (0.39) (0.39) (0.41) (0.38) (0.36) (0.37) (0.37) (0.39) 
Ex-investor in financial sector 0.47    0.51 0.48    0.41 
 (0.46)    (0.47) (0.41)    (0.43) 
Previous employment in financial 
sector  -0.21   -0.23  0.11   0.02 
  (0.41)   (0.42)  (0.43)   (0.44) 
Finance or economics-related 
education   0.06  0.10   0.47  0.51 
   (0.38)  (0.39)   (0.40)  (0.41) 
Finance committee member    0.05 0.11    -0.49 -0.43 
    (0.35) (0.36)    (0.35) (0.36)            
Voter interest controls Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Special interest controls Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Political controls# Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Census controls Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
State fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Observations 405 405 405 405 405 411 411 411 411 411 
Chi-squared 128.8 129.1 128.7 128.8 129 132 132 133.8 133.1 137.7 
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Note: This table reports on variations of the main specification to explain the House vote on the EESA. We include our preferred measure of personal wealth interests 
(Investor in financial sector) and add consecutively (columns 1-4 and 6-9) proxies for unobserved preferences for the financial sector. In columns 5 and 10 we add all 
proxies for unobserved preferences for the financial sector at the same time. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. See appendix A for variable definitions. 
***, **, *, denotes significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.       
 #Political controls do not include the finance committee member variable. 
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TABLE 6 
USING SPOUSAL DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLAN RETURNS AS A SOURCE OF EXOGENOUS VARIATION 
IN POLITICIANS’ WEALTH 
 
   
 LOGIT 
 H.R. 3997 H.R. 1424 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
        
Return on spousal DC plan§ 3.90***  2.74  
 (1.33)  (1.78)  
Negative return on spousal DC plan＃  1.47*  1.63* 
  (0.75)  (0.85) 
     
Controls Included Included Included Included 
State fixed effects Excluded Excluded Excluded Excluded 
Observations 84 84 81 81 
Chi-squared 21.47 15.31 22.97 26.14 
p-value 0.43 0.81 0.29 0.16 
 
NOTE.—This table reports politician-level logit regressions on the vote in favor of H.R. 3997 and on the 
vote in favor of H.R. 1424 for the sensitivity of personal wealth interests to the financial sector. We use 
a sub sample of politicians whose spouses participated in Defined Contribution plans. Conditional on 
participation, we use the 2008 annual return on the IRA plan multiplied by −1 and an indicator variable 
that equals one if the annual return on the spousal IRA plan was negative in 2008 as a source of 
exogenous variation in the politician’s wealth sensitivity to the financial sector. All models include the 
full set of controls from table 2. See appendix A for variable definitions. Robust standard errors are 
included in parentheses below the coefficient estimates.  
* Significant at 10%. 
** Significant at 5%. 
*** Significant at 1%. 
The ＃denotes an indicator variable.  
§ Positive values denote a loss (i.e., negative returns) in 2008 and negative values denote a gain. 
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TABLE 7 
TREATMENT EFFECT ESTIMATES BASED ON NEAREST NEIGHBORHOOD MATCHING ON IDEOLOGY AND PARTY AFFILIATION 
 
 
 HOUSE VOTE ON H.R. 3997 HOUSE VOTE ON H.R. 1424 
Personal wealth proxy: 
Investor in financial sector 
Party affiliation DW-Nominate Party affiliation DW-Nominate 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ATE    0.116** 0.131** 0.096* 0.105** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) 
     
Observations 433 433 434 434 
Additional matching 
variables 
PAC donations,  
Voter opposition against 
bailout 
PAC donations,  
Voter opposition against 
bailout 
PAC donations,  
Voter opposition against 
bailout 
PAC donations,  
Voter opposition against 
bailout 
Exact match Yes No Yes No 
 
Note: This table presents nearest neighborhood matching average treatment effect estimates (Abadie and Imbens, 2006; Abadie and Imbens 2011) of the 
preferred measure of personal wealth (i.e., “Investor in financial sector” onto the vote on H.R. 3997 and on H.R. 1424. Politicians are matched based on the 
campaign donations from financial institutions and on the degree of voter opposition against the EESA in their district. In Columns (1 and 3), we present the 
bias-corrected average treatment effect estimate when we also perform an exact match on Party affiliation of the politician. Columns (2 and 4) present the 
treatment effect when matching on the DW-Nominate measure of a given politician’s ideology. See appendix A for variable definitions. Inferences are based 
on robust Abadie-Imbens standard errors.  
* Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%, *** Significant at 1%. 
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TABLE 8 
CROSS-SECTIONAL VARIATION IN THE AVERAGE MARGINAL EFFECTS OF ASSET HOLDINGS IN THE FINANCIAL SECTOR  
 
 HOUSE VOTE ON H.R. 3997 HOUSE VOTE ON H.R. 1424 
 Percentage of voters 
opposing bank bailout 
Log(Long term PAC donations 
by financial sector) 
Percentage of voters 
opposing bank bailout 
Log(Long term PAC donations 
by financial sector) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Below median Below median 
Non-investor in 
financial sector 
0.50*** 
(0.05) 
0.31*** 
(0.05) 
0.72*** 
(0.05) 
0.51*** 
(0.05) 
Investor in financial 
sector 
0.79*** 
(0.07) 
0.77*** 
(0.08) 
0.85*** 
(0.05) 
0.74*** 
(0.08) 
 Above median Above median 
Non-investor in 
financial sector 
0.28*** 
(0.05) 
0.48*** 
(0.06) 
0.44*** 
(0.06) 
0.69*** 
(0.05) 
Investor in financial 
sector 
0.71*** 
(0.08) 
0.79*** 
(0.07) 
0.76*** 
(0.07) 
0.90*** 
(0.04) 
Double difference 0.14 
(0.12) 
–0.14 
(0.12) 
0.18* 
(0.11) 
0.03 
(0.12) 
NOTE.—This table presents the cross-sectional variation in the average marginal effects of a given politician holding assets in the financial sector (or not) on 
the propensity to vote in favor of EESA. We present the marginal effects computed from our augmented main specification, which now includes an interaction 
term (and simple effect) of the percentage of voters opposing bank bailout and the natural logarithm of the long term PAC donations by financial sector, each 
added one-by-one. For ease of interpretation, we transform both of these variables into indicator variables that take the value of unity for scores above the 
median, and zero otherwise. All other independent variables are evaluated at their mean. The final row presents the estimate of the “double difference”, i.e., the 
differential marginal effect between non-investor and investor in financial sector compared across the above and below median value of the interacting variable. 
See appendix A for variable definitions. Robust standard errors are reported below the marginal effects estimates in parentheses. 
* Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%, *** Significant at 1%. 
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